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SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2021
Dr. Benjamin Reed Department of Computer Science
Dr. Navrati Saxena Department of Computer Science
Dr. Alexander Shraer Apple Cloud Platform, Apple
ABSTRACT
WITNESS FOR TWO-SITE ENABLED COORDINATION
by Sriram Priyatham Siram
Many replicated data services utilize majority quorums to safely replicate data
changes in the presence of server failures. Majority quorum-based services require a
simple majority of the servers to be operational for the service to stay available. A key
limitation of the majority quorum is that if a service is composed of just two servers,
progress cannot be made even if a single server fails because the majority quorum size is
also two. This is called the Two-Server problem. A problem similar to the Two-Server
problem occurs when a service’s servers are spread across only two failure domains.
Servers in a failure domain can fail together. When one of the two failure domains fails,
the servers in the other failure domain may not be able to form a majority quorum,
rendering the service unavailable. We call this the Two-Site Problem, where each site is
one failure domain. We propose to solve the Two-Server problem by using witnesses,
lightweight servers that only store metadata required to participate in a quorum. We show
that the solution to the Two-Server problem is also applicable to the Two-Site problem.
We tested this solution in the context of Zookeeper, a replicated coordination service.
Zookeeper utilizes the Zookeeper Atomic Broadcast (Zab) protocol to replicate its
coordination data. We designed and incorporated witnesses in Zab. We show that our
solution has increased the liveness of Zookeeper in the two-server scenario. We also show
that Zab’s safety properties are not affected by these changes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Replicating data across multiple servers enables a service to tolerate failures. Quorum
systems [1] are usually used to perform replication and they require a quorum of replicas
(e.g., a majority) to be available in order to guarantee the availability and recoverability of
the service. Quorum systems will not work with just 2 replicas because a majority cannot
be reached even if a single server fails. In other words, a quorum system formed with just
2 replicas will not tolerate even a single failure. This is called the two-server problem. A
typical solution to this is to add a new replica so that a quorum can be reached in the
presence of one failure.
Replicas that belong to a quorum system are usually distributed across multiple failure
domains. Replicas that are hosted in a failure domain can fail together. When a quorum
system’s replicas are spread across just two failure domains, it can suffer from a problem
similar to the two server problem. The failure of one of the two failure domains can make
the quorum system unavailable. Let us understand this with a simple example. Consider a
quorum system QS composed of 4 replicas, distributed across two failure domains with
each failure domain hosting two replicas. Since we have 4 replicas, the majority quorum
size is three. When any one of the two data centers fails, the two replicas it hosts will also
fail. The remaining two operational replicas in the other data center cannot form a
majority quorum. As a result, QS becomes unavailable. We call this the two-site problem,
where each site is one failure domain. Like the two-server problem, a typical solution for
the two-site problem is to host an additional replica in a third independent failure domain.
The scope of a failure domain can be defined at multiple levels. At the highest level, an
entire data center is defined as one failure domain. Deciding to construct a third data
center to solve the two-site problem is a very costly decision to make, especially when an
organization is in the early stages of its growth trajectory.
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In this project, we will analyze this problem in the context of Zookeeper [2], a
coordination service. One solution is to host a third Zookeeper replica on a third-party
cloud service provider like Amazon Web Services (AWS) [3] or Google Cloud (GCP) [4].
While this solution solves the problem at hand, it involves hosting sensitive enterprise
data in a third-party environment. Instead, we propose to incorporate the concept of
witnesses [5] in Zookeeper’s replication protocol. A witness only holds the metadata
about coordination activity, and participates in the quorum when the in-house replicas
cannot form a quorum. The witness server can then be hosted in a third-party cloud
instead of a replica.
In Section 2, we explain the concepts required to understand the problem statement
and the solution described in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of Zookeeper
Atomic Broadcast(ZAB) protocol. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the modifications made to
ZAB to incorporate witnesses. In Section 8, we analyze the impact of witnesses on Zab’s




Large scale internet services are composed of multiple independent software
components which run on thousands of physical machines. These components have to
coordinate with each other in order to perform their tasks. For example, consider a service
that can be horizontally scaled based on workload. As request load increases, new
instances of the service have to be created and as the load decreases, some of the service
instances can be shutdown or released. Naturally, you would employ a load balancer
component to distribute the load among the operational service instances. For the load
balancer to do its job correctly, it should be able to connect and route requests to the
operational service instances and disconnect with service instances which have been
shutdown or failed. The logic to track states of service instances can be added to the load
balancer itself. However, this is a very complex task and hard to implement correctly.
Moreover, it deviates from the core functionality of a load balancer. Instead as shown in
Figure 1, we can leverage an external coordination service to track service instances and
notify the load balancer when a new service instance is added or removed. Further when a
service instance comes up it can write its connection information to the coordination
service and the load balancer can read from it. This is just one use-case, coordination
services implement a general method of coordination that developers can use to build
their internet services. They have enabled systems to scale and adapt to configuration
changes, the addition and removal of hardware, and system failures.
While the coordination service provides a simple abstraction for developers to work
with, it also makes the coordination service a critical component of the service. If the
coordination service goes down, it often takes the rest of the internet service down with it.
For this reason, coordination services use replication protocols to continue to provide
service even if some of the replicas providing the coordination service go down. These
3
Fig. 1: Load Balancer using a Coordination Service.
1. When a service instance starts up, it connects and registers itself with the coordination
service. The Coordination service provides primitives that can detect whether a service
instance is alive or has failed.
2. The Coordination service notifies the Load balancer when the list of Active Service
instances changes: a new service instance has been added or an existing instance has been
removed. The Load balancer read the service instance’s connection information from the
coordination service.
reliable coordination services are used extensively in industry. ZooKeeper [2] , Chubby [6]
(Google), and Raft [7] (used in etcd [8] open-source project) are all examples of services
in common use. They have proven reliable and are used extensively across the industry.
2.2 Replication
At a high level a coordination service is software that stores coordination data and
provides coordination functionality by using the stored data. In our load balancer use case,
the list of operational service instances and their connection information are examples of
coordination data. Components consider coordination services as ground truth. If the
coordination service is hosted on a single machine, its failure could cause cascading
failures across the entire service because dependent components can no longer coordinate
with other components in the service. To tolerate failures, coordination data is replicated
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across multiple servers. Each server is called a replica, it holds a complete copy of the
coordination data and can serve coordination change requests. The idea is that even if a
subset of replicas fail, the remaining operational replicas should continue to provide
coordination functionality to the clients. For this to work, the coordination service should
keep all its replicas synchronized by continuously notifying them of incoming data
change requests. In practice, this is usually done by an underlying replication protocol.
In the presence of a continuous load of change requests, to keep the replicas
consistent, the replication protocol should establish a total order among all the incoming
change requests and ensure that all the replicas apply all the changes in the established
order. These properties are guaranteed by Atomic Broadcast Protocols [9], [10]. Atomic
broadcast protocols use messages to inform replicas of changes. When a message is first
broadcast to replicas, it may or may not be received by all the replicas. Failures may
prevent transmission. For example, the replica preparing the broadcast may fail, the
network might drop the messages, or the other replicas might not be listening for
messages from the broadcasting replicas.
Chandra et al. [10] reduce Atomic Broadcast to the Consensus problem. So, the
FLP [11] impossibility result is also applicable to the Atomic Broadcast problem. That is,
in an asynchronous system, a deterministic algorithm cannot solve the Atomic Broadcast
problem even if a single replica fails. The authors proposed an approach to workaround
the impossibility result by adding a failure detection mechanism to the asynchronous
model. They proved that an asynchronous system of n replicas that uses an eventually
weak failure detector, can perform atomic broadcast if the number of failures are less than⌈n
2
⌉
, that is, a majority of replicas should be operational.
There is a point, between the time a message is first broadcast and the time it is fully
replicated, at which a broadcasted message becomes decided. Once a message is decided,
replicas can incorporate the change contained in the message into their replica of the
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coordination data. Based on the above majority requirement, a change becomes decided
once it has been replicated to a majority of replicas, called a majority quorum. While
there are different types of quorums, in this document we only discuss the majority
quorums. Hence, we use the terms quorum and majority quorum interchangeably. A
Quorum System is a set of all valid quorums that can be formed by a cluster of servers,
such that every two quorums in the set intersect.
Requirement 2.1 (Quorum Intersection). Given a set Q that is the set of all valid
quorums and each member Qi of Q has a non-empty set of replicas that make up the
quorum, we require any two pairs of quorums chosen from Q to have at least one replica
in common:
∀Qi,Q j ∈ Q : Qi∩Q j 6= /0
This means that any two quorums will have at least one server in common. Majority
quorums is the default for the services in use today because a majority quorum is easy to
define: any set of servers that have more than half the servers in it will be a quorum.




+1 servers can form a majority
quorum. For example, in a cluster with 5 replicas, any 3 servers can form a majority
quorum. This cluster can make progress as long as any 3 i.e a simple majority of replicas
are functional. That means it can tolerate the failure of 2 replicas. One can determine the
size of the cluster based on the number of failures they want to handle. In the above
example we have seen that, to tolerate 2 replica failures we need to deploy 5 replicas.
This observation can be generalized using the following formula. Let n be the number of
replicas and f be the number of failures that you want to tolerate.
n = 2 f +1
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This means that, in order to ensure that your service can still form a majority quorum
even after f replicas fail, you need to deploy 2 f +1 replicas. Based on this generalization,
the smallest number of failures that can be tolerated is 1 and you need a minimum of 3
replicas to do that.
If your cluster has just 2 replicas, the majority quorum size is also 2. So even if one
replica fails, the remaining replica will not be able to make progress as it cannot form a
majority quorum. In this document, we refer to this problem as the Two Server problem.
We will discuss more about the two server problem in Section 3.
2.2.1 Leader-Follower protocols
The efficiency and simplicity of ordering requests in Atomic Broadcast protocols can
be increased by electing a designated server called the Leader. All the incoming change
requests are forwarded to the Leader. It is responsible for ordering all the requests and
broadcasting them to remaining servers in the cluster called the Followers. When the
Leader server fails, another server in the cluster has to be elected as the new leader.
Protocols that adopt Leader-Follower approach can provide FIFO Atomic Broadcast [9]
properties, which are stronger than the Total Order property provided by Atomic
Broadcast.
2.2.2 Core replication protocol
Many well-known replication protocols [7], [12] in use today follow the same basic
set of steps illustrated in Figure 2, to replicate a single change. When the leader replica
receives a change request it prepares a message with the change and broadcasts the
message to all the follower replicas. Once a follower replica receives a message, it
persists the message and sends an acknowledgement to the leader. Once the leader
receives acknowledgements from a quorum of replicas including itself, it decides that the
change has been fully replicated. It then, broadcasts a Commit message to the follower
replicas to let them know that the change can now be applied to their local data copy.
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Fig. 2: The basic replication protocol. The leader broadcasts a message M. Once each
follower stores M it sends an acknowledge (ACK) message.
While the core replication protocol seems fairly intuitive, challenges arise when
dealing with failures. As mentioned earlier, replicas can fail, they can get partitioned from
other replicas or the network can drop messages. For example, if the leader replica fails,
there should be a way of selecting another replica as the new leader. The new leader
should complete the replication of any changes that could have been delivered (i.e.,
decided) by some replicas with the help of the previous leader. When a failed replica
recovers, the replication protocol should ensure that it receives any changes that it has
missed while it was down. The various combination of failure and recovery
scenarios(including failures that happen during recovery itself) is what leads to the
difficulty in designing and implementing replication protocols.
2.3 Failure Domains
A failure domain is constituted by a set of entities that can potentially fail together
because of a common problem. This common problem is typically the failure of a
resource shared by these entities. The resource could be the power source, network switch,
a disk, a cooling system or just the geographical proximity between the entities. Failure
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domains can be defined at various levels. A physical server hosting multiple virtual
machines can be considered one failure domain because when the physical server fails, all
the virtual machines it hosts also fail. If racks in a data center are connected to a set of
independent power sources, then the subset of racks that are connected to the same power
source form an independent failure domain because the failure of a specific power source
only effects servers in those subset of racks. Failure domains can also be defined based on
network connectivity, like servers connected to the same switch. As illustrated in Figure 3,
a data center can be considered as one failure domain because an earthquake or power
grid failure can take the entire data center down. To safe guard against data center failures,
quorum based replication systems distribute their replicas across multiple data centers.
Commonly, quorum based systems require that replicas are spread across at least three
independent failure domains with each failure domain hosting a subset of replicas in such
a way that a quorum can still be formed when one of the domains fails.
2.4 Past Research on Witnesses
Unlike the normal replicas that keep track of the messages being replicated, a witness
only keeps track of the metadata of messages being replicated. Witnesses were first used
to keep replicated files consistent [5]. Later they were used in the Harp file system, also
for consistency [13]. Witnesses were conceptualized based on an observation that a server
need not maintain a complete data copy in order to participate in a quorum, it just needs to
store information about the latest change that was successfully replicated. The term is not
used very consistently in modern literature. For example, a recent paper [14] in USENIX
NSDI uses the term witnesses to describe servers that store requests that have not been
decided upon. Google Spanner [15] is an example of a modern system that uses witnesses.
Witnesses do not store a full copy of the state, and hence do not serve client requests.
They can, however, be part of a quorum and hence can help other replicas reach
consensus or elect a new leader. It may also know from its metadata that some decided
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Fig. 3: Simple Failure Domain Hierarchy
data is missing, but it will not be able to supply that data. Witnesses have two big
advantages when they are hosted by a third-party cloud provider. First, bandwidth to
third-party service providers may be lower than the dedicated links to company servers
and data centers. Fortunately, because witnesses don’t serve client requests, the bandwidth
requirements to the witness will be less than normal replicas. Second, companies are
hesitant to let third-parties store and manage their data. If in addition, witnesses manage
only metadata, none of the company data is sent to the third-party service provider, but
the third-party can observe and manipulate the metadata.
The authors of [16] have utilized witnesses in Raft [7] distributed consensus algorithm
in order to reduce its energy foot print. Raft, like ZAB [12] requires a static quorum of
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votes to replicate changes. In [17], as the witnesses hold just the metadata and do not
serve any client requests, they can be hosted on light weight servers [17], [18]. Hence, by
replacing a minority subset of replicas in a Raft cluster with witnesses, the overall energy
foot print of the algorithm can be reduced. The authors have described the metadata that
needs to be stored on a witness for it to participate in Raft protocol. Their analysis on the
effects of replacing replicas with witnesses on the availability showed that the availability
of an n replica Raft cluster is equivalent to that of a cluster made up of r replicas and w
witnesses where n = r+w, whereas the durability of the cluster decreases as the number
of witnesses increases because a quorum could be formed with just one full replica.
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3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
As described in section 2.2, the two server problem arises when a majority quorum
based system is composed of just two servers. A consensus decision cannot be made even
if one server fails because the size of the quorum is also two. The availability of a two
server quorum system is equivalent to a single server system, because the failure of a
server will render both the systems unavailable. This is a key limitation of majority
quorums. One obvious solution to this problem is to add a third server in order to tolerate
one server failure. There are other ways of dealing with the two server problem. The
surviving server could start making decisions if it had a way to find out if the other server
was down [19], [20]. Coordination services can be used to implement such a solution, but
in this case we are implementing the coordination service.
A cluster using majority quorum may become unavailable not only when there are just
two servers but also when the servers in a cluster are just spread across two failure
domains, even if the cluster is composed of more than two servers. This is similar to the
two server problem except that here instead of a server failure, the failure of one domain
out of the two failure domains can prevent the cluster from forming a majority quorum.
Thus making it unavailable. In this document we call this, the two-site problem, where
each site is one failure domain. This claim is explained through the following set of
examples. In these examples, we will consider domain failures instead of individual server
failures. A domain failure causes all the servers inside it to fail. The terms site and failure
domains are used interchangeably. Figure 4a, shows a cluster containing two servers,
spread across two failure domains FD1 and FD2 each hosting one server.
If FD1 fails, the sole server in FD2 cannot take decisions because it can no longer
form a quorum. This illustrates the classic two server problem. Earlier we saw that adding
a third server solves the two server problem, let us try doing that here. Since we only have
two failure domains, the new server should be added to either one of them. In Figure 4b
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(a) Two Servers in two failure domains (b) Three Servers in two failure domains
Fig. 4: Illustrates two server problem in a cluster of 2 servers and 3 servers, spread across
two failure domains. The failure domains are named FD1 and FD2. The servers are named
R1, R2 and R3
we can see that a new server has been added to FD2. If FD2 fails, there will be only one
operational server in the three server cluster. As a result the cluster becomes unavailable.
However, if FD1 fails, the cluster remains available as a quorum can be formed with the
two operational servers in FD2. Through this example we can see that a three sever
cluster may offer more availability than a two server cluster. This increase in availability
cannot be guaranteed because either of the two domains can fail. Hence, we cannot use
this observation in solving two-site problem. Figure 5 shows a similar example containing
a 4 server cluster.
From these examples we can see that, regardless of the number of servers in a cluster,
we cannot use majority quorums when there are only two failure domains without
compromising on availability. We need to host at least one more server in a third
independent failure domain to tolerate the failure of one domain. This is illustrated in
figure 6. We need to distribute replicas in such a way that a majority quorum cannot be
formed by just the replicas in any one failure domain, because if that failure domain fails
the service becomes unavailable despite having three failure domains. An uneven
distribution is illustrated in Figure 7. In section 2.3, we have described that the
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(a) Four Servers in two failure domains (b) Five Servers in two failure domains
Fig. 5: Illustrates two server problem in a cluster of 4 servers and 5 servers, spread across
two failure domains. The failure domains are named FD1 and FD2. The servers are named
R1 to R5
(a) Three Servers in three failure domains (b) Five Servers in three failure domains
Fig. 6: Servers in the clusters are evenly distributed across three independent failure
domains. With this distribution, failure of servers in one failure domain will not stop the
servers in other two domains forming a majority quorum.
boundaries of a failure domain vary based on the type resource shared by the entities. If
the coordination service is hosting its replicas on two racks in a data center, to solve the
two server problem, we can procure a server from a third rack and host the new replica on
it or move a subset of existing replicas to the new rack. Since a data center has a large
number of racks, procuring a server from a new rack is cheap. The prohibitively
expensive two failure domain scenario is when the failure domains are data centers since
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Fig. 7: In this 5 server cluster, servers are unevenly distributed across the three failure
domains. FD1 and FD2 each host one server. Whereas, FD3 hosts 3 servers. Servers in
FD3 can form a quorum without the help of FD1 or FD2. However, server in FD1 and
FD2 definitely need servers in FD3 to form a quorum. So, if FD3 goes down, a majority
quorum cannot be formed until FD3 recovers. Distributions like this should be avoided.
it is costly to get a third data center. Thus, even when you have two data centers with
many servers in them, since each data center is a failure domain no matter how many
servers you have in each failure domain it will still have the two-site problem: if one
failure domain fails, the other can no longer safely operate.
Note that many big companies already have multiple data centers, so this is not a
problem they might need to address. However, growing companies are focused on
developing their service and have to make a choice to invest in solving the two-site
problem or invest in developing their service at the expense of service reliability and
fault-tolerance. This two-site problem happens early in the growth trajectory of internet
services. When an internet service starts, it is usually made up of a couple of servers in a
single data center. As the service grows for reasons of scale and reliability, the service
will expand to a second data center. For example, some companies that hosted their
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servers on the east coast realized their availability could be compromised due to recent
violent storms. This can motivate companies to find a second data center to host their
service in case the first data center fails.
If a data center does fail, the coordination service can detect the failure and coordinate
automatic service reconfiguration to get everything actively hosted in the remaining data
center. Since the coordination service will also be hosted in the same data centers as the
company’s internet service, a data center failure could make the coordination service
unavailable. As a result the automatic service reconfiguration does not happen, rendering
the entire internet service unavailable. We need a solution to this critical point in the
growth of a service.
Ideally, we could host one replica of the coordination service in the machine of a
cloud provider like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure or Google Cloud Platform.
This will provide us with the required third failure domain without having to invest in
building a new data center. But hosting a complete replica of the coordination data outside
an organization’s network boundary gives rise to security concerns because, coordination
service usually hold critical data.
In section 2.4, we have seen that witnesses can participate in quorum by only storing
the metadata required for replication. They need not store the entire copy of the
coordination data. To solve the two-site problem in a replicated coordination service, we
propose to incorporate witnesses in its replication protocol and host the witness on a
cloud provider’s machine. By doing this, we will get the required third independent
failure domain without storing any actual coordination data outside the organization’s
network boundary. Figure 8 depicts this solution.
From Figure 4a we can see that two-server problem is a special case of the two-site
problem where each server is in one failure domain. So, our solution for the two-site
problem also solves the two-server problem. However, quorum based replication protocols
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Fig. 8: Witness hosted in a third independent failure domain. When one of the data centers
fail, the servers in the surviving data center can form a majority quorum with the help of
witness.
in use today [7], [12], just check if a majority quorum of servers has agreed on a change
or not, they do not consider the distribution of those servers across independent failure
domains. Since they just count servers, we should modify the replication protocol to count
the witness’s vote while verifying a quorum. So, if we solve the two server problem by
using a witness, it can be easily generalized to the two-site scenario. While, explaining
protocol changes in Section 6, we consider a 3 server cluster formed by 2 Replicas and 1
witness.
We prototyped our idea on Apache Zookeeper, a state of the art replicated
coordination service. Zookeeper uses Zookeeper Atomic Broadcast (ZAB) protocol to
replicate its coordination data. We have modified ZAB to work with witnesses. Section 4,
provides an overview of ZAB. Section 5, describes the specification of a witness in ZAB.
Section 6, describes how ZAB works with witnesses and Section 7, describes the
implementation.
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4 OVERVIEW OF ZOOKEEPER ATOMIC BROADCAST PROTOCOL
Zookeeper is a replicated coordination service. It propagates coordination data
changes to its replicas in a primary backup manner. All the data change requests are
forwarded to the primary server, it executes the requests and replicates the incremental
state changes to the backup replicas using Zab, the Zookeeper Atomic Broadcast Protocol.
In this section, we review the working Zab from an implementation perspective. So, some
of the terms used in this document may differ from [12]. In the original Zab protocol, all
the participating servers are replicas. There was no concept of witnesses. Hence, in this
section we use the terms replicas and servers interchangeably. A simple abstract
explanation of Zab can also be found in Section 2 of [21].
Zab replicates state changes in the form of transactions. Each transaction is assigned a
unique identifier called zxid. Zab relies on the presence of a single Leader replica
supported by a quorum of replicas to ensure liveness. When a quorum of replicas is not
operational Zab does not allow Zookeeper to commit new state changes. Zab ensures
correctness even when a quorum is not available but ensures liveness only when a quorum
can be formed. The safety and liveness properties of ZAB are discussed in more detail in
section 8.
Zab servers can be in three states: looking for a leader (Looking), Following, and
Leading. When a server starts up it enters Looking state. It looks for a leader by running
an instance of the leader election algorithm which elects a single server as the leader. At
the end of the leader election, the server is either elected as the leader or it finds out that
another server has been elected as the leader. If a server is elected, it transitions to
Leading state and becomes the leader. Otherwise, it transitions to the Following state and
becomes a follower. Once a server transitions to Leading or Following it executes an
iteration of the three phases of Zab protocol: Discovery, Synchronization, and Broadcast.
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These phases are executed one after the other. Each iteration of the Zab protocol is
identified by a unique value called the epoch.
List of persistent variables:
1) acceptedEpoch: when a new leader tries to start leading, it starts a new epoch. This
value is the last new leader epoch (newEpoch) value acknowledged by this replica. It
is initially 0.
2) currentEpoch: The epoch value in the last new leader proposal acknowledged by a
server. Once this value is set, it means that a new leader has been established for that
epoch. It is initially 0.
3) Zxid: unique identifier of the last transaction accepted by a server.
In the Discovery phase, the value of the new epoch is decided. In the Synchronization
phase, the states of all the replicas are made consistent with the elected leader’s state and
the epoch of this iteration is established, and it is called the currentEpoch. Replication of
new state changes begins in the broadcast phase.
4.1 ZAB phases in detail
Now let us discuss the Zab protocol in more detail. Assume that a server just
completed its leader election, transitioned to the Following state and began its Discovery
phase. It establishes a connection with the potential leader and sends its acceptedEpoch.
The potential leader uses the acceptedEpoch received from a majority of servers in the
ensemble to generate a new epoch(newEpoch) that is greater than all the received epochs
and broadcasts the new epoch to all the servers. Upon receiving the newEpoch from the
potential leader, the follower server accepts it if the newE poch≥ acceptedE poch and
sends the NEWEPOCH-ACK to the potential leader. The follower includes its last logged
zxid in the acknowledgment. It then begins its Synchronization phase. Once the potential
leader receives acknowledgments about the newEpoch from a quorum of servers in the
ensemble including itself, it begins its Synchronization phase.
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Fig. 9: Zab protocol summary. R1 and R2 are two replicas. R1 is the Leader. R2 is the
Follower.
At this point, both the potential leader and the follower servers have begun their
Synchronization phases. The potential leader compares its last logged zxid value with the
zxid value sent by the follower in the NEWEPCOH-ACK. It then sends any missing
transactions to the follower and brings the follower’s state up to date with itself. It
concurrently performs this task with all the connected followers. The leader handles
communication with each follower independently using a separate thread called
LearnerHandler. Once a leader brings a follower up to date with itself, it sends the
NEWLEADER message to that follower. A follower responds to that new leader message
with NEWLEADER-ACK and transitions to the Broadcast phase. Once the potential
leader receives NEWLEADER-ACKs from a quorum of servers including itself, we say
that the potential leader has established itself as the Leader of the new epoch and a new
epoch has been established. The leader then transitions to the Broadcast phase and it can
now begin processing new client requests.
When the leader receives a client request directly or from another follower, it first
creates a transaction with a unique zxid, logs that transaction, creates a Proposal from that
transaction, and then sends out the Proposal to its followers. When a follower receives a
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Proposal from the leader, it logs that Proposal and responds with an
ACK(acknowledgment). Once the leader receives ACKs from a quorum of followers, it
means that the transaction has been decided. The leader now commits that transaction
locally and sends out a COMMIT message to its followers, so that they can also apply it
to their in-memory state and make it visible to clients.
4.2 Detecting server failures
Zab uses timeouts to detect server failures. The passage of time is measured using a
unit called tick. Each tick is equivalent to a configurable number of milliseconds. The
Leader sends hearbeat messages to its followers once per a configured time interval
measured in ticks. When a follower, does not receive a message from the Leader within
that time interval, it closes its connection with the Leader, transitions to Looking and
starts a Leader Election. When the leader does not receive response for heartbeat
messages from a follower withing the time interval, it stops communicating with that
follower and assumes it has lost the support of that follower. It also periodically checks if
it has the support a quorum of followers. If it detects that it has lost the support of a
quorum, it relinquishes its leadership, transitions to Looking state and triggers a round of
Leader election.
4.3 Leader Election
Zab uses a quorum based leader election algorithm. The algorithm ensures that out of
all the servers participated in the leader election, the server with the latest state becomes
the leader. Server state comparisons happen based on the currentEpoch and the
lastLoggedZxid values. If two servers have the same state, then the unique server
identifier (sid) is used as the tie breaker. The server having the largest sid value wins the
tie. Servers vote for each other during the election by exchanging vote notification
messages. A vote notification message contains the following parts.
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1) sourceId: sid of the server that sent the notification
2) proposedLeader : sid of the server that the sender has voted for.
3) proposedLeaderState〈currentEpoch,lastLoggedZxid〉: State of the
proposedLeader is composed of two fields currentEpoch of the proposed leader and
lastLoggedZxid, the zxid of the last transaction that was added to the proposed
leader’s transaction log.
4) electionEpoch: is a replicated in-memory counter maintained by all operational
zookeeper servers in an ensemble. It represents the number of times a zookeeper
ensemble has participated in the leader election. A server increments its local copy
of electionEpoch at the beginning of the leader election. During leader election, if
the electionEpoch value in a received vote notification is greater than a server’s
electionEpoch, the server updates its value.
Note: Here we listed only the subset of information sent in a vote notification message,
relevant to the discussion in this document.
During leader election, each server maintains the identifier and the state of the
candidate that it is currently supporting in the currentVote object. Each server runs an
instance of the leader election algorithm once it transitions to Looking state. A server
exits/stops the leader election once it receives a quorum of votes for the candidate in its
currentVote. A server starts the leader election with an intention of becoming the leader.
Therefore, it initializes the currentVote with its own information and broadcasts the
currentVote to all the servers. It also votes for itself. A server receiving the vote
notification could either be participating in the leader election (in Looking state) or not (in
Leading or Following states.).
When a server in Looking state receives a vote from another server in Looking state,
it compares the state of the received vote with its currentVote. There are three outcomes
for this comparison. One, the candidate it currently supporting has a more recent state
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than the one in the received vote. Hence, it ignores the received vote. Two, the candidate
in the received vote has a more recent state than its currently supported candidate. So, it
begins supporting the new candidate by updating its current vote and broadcasts its
updated currentVote to other servers in the ensemble. Three, the candidate in the received
vote and its currentVote is the same. So, it increments the vote count for that candidate
and checks if the candidate has received a quorum of votes. If a quorum is reached, the
server exits the leader election.
A server not participating in the Leader election will be either Leading or Following.
When such a server, say S1, receives a vote from a server in Looking state, S2. S1
responds by sending its currentVote to S2. S2 counts S1’s current vote and checks if a
quorum of servers is following the server in S1’s current vote. Note that the currentVote of
S1 can contain its own identifier if S1 is the Leader. Such a sequence of exchanges usually
happens when a server is trying to join an ensemble for which a leader has already been
established. S2 exits the leader election and joins the ensemble it has received a quorum
of votes for a particular leader, including the leader’s vote.
4.4 Learner Handler
A Leader communicates with its followers through LearnerHandler threads. Each
LearnerHandler communicates with one Follower via a bi-directional communication
channel established by the Follower. The Leader broadcasts a message to its followers by
first sending it to the corresponding LearnerHandler. The LearnerHandler in turn sends
the message to its associated Follower by writing to the channel. The Follower, receives
that message by reading from the channel, processes it and writes its response or
acknowledgement back to channel. The LearnerHandler receives this acknowledgement
by reading from the channel and passes it on to the Leader.
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5 SYSTEM MODEL
Including the witness, an N-node zookeeper ensemble will now contain N−1
Replicas and 1 witness. A Witness server has an associated stable storage device.
Witnesses adopt the same crash-recovery model defined in Zab. A witness exchanges
messages with other replicas in Zab through a combination of Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) invocations and bidirectional channels. The bidirectional channels in this model
assume the definition and properties of bidirectional channels described in Zab’s system
model. We assume that zookeeper replicas will run inside an organization’s network
boundary. A witness may run outside the network boundary of an organization, e.g., in a
public cloud. So the witness may behave in a byzantine manner. However, in this
document we assume that a witness is non-byzantine and just focus on its functionality.
We defer handling of byzantine behavior to future work. In this document we have
introduced a new term, Natural Quorum, defined as a Quorum consisting of replicas (and
not the witness). The following subsections explain what a witness can do and cannot do,
what it stores and how Zab protocol must be adjusted to accommodate witnesses.
5.1 Scope
While we are not discussing the handling of a byzantine witness in this work, we want
this work to act as the basis for future work that will focus on modifying Zab to handle
byzantine witnesses. With this goal in mind, we designed the witness to participate in Zab
without knowing the internals of Zab. We set up three important design goals to achieve
this.
5.1.1 Design Goals
1) Use the witness in the quorum only when a natural quorum cannot be formed.
2) Witness should participate in ZAB without being aware of the various ZAB phases.
3) Minimize witness’s interaction with replicas in the cluster.
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Based on the explanation in Section 4, the Zab protocol can be divided into two parts.
Part 1, leader election. Part 2, Discovery, Synchronization, and Broadcast. In this work,
we focused on Part 2. Hence, the above design goals are primarily applicable to Part 2.
Modifying the leader election algorithm to apply all the design goals will be part of future
work. The core part of the leader election remains unchanged. We have modified the
algorithm to prevent the witness from becoming a leader as it does not store data.
5.2 Witness Specification
The witness does not store transaction data. A ZAB witness server has two states,
LOOKING and FOLLOWING. When it starts up, it will be in LOOKING state. In
LOOKING state, the witness participates in the leader election. A witness’s participation
in the leader election is only limited to voting for other candidates. It cannot become a
leader. It does not vote for itself. It does not become a candidate.
The witness transitions to FOLLOWING state at the end of an election. The Leader
can consider the witness in FOLLOWING state as Active or Passive. The witness does not
know if it is Active or Passive. Only the Leader is aware of this information. The Leader
will use the Active or Passive categorization of a witness to determine when to send
transaction related information to the witness and how to use the responses returned by it.
This categorization allows us to achieve the first design goal. Design goals 2 and 3 have
been achieved by modeling the witness as a register when it is in FOLLOWING state. It
just stores certain metadata along with a number that acts as a version of that metadata.
Metadata: The following metadata is stored in the witness.
• acceptedEpoch: Initialized to 0.
• currentEpoch: Initialized to 0.
• zxid: Initialized to 0.
Version: A separate number used to identify the current version of the metadata
stored by the witness. It is initialized to 0.
25
When the witness starts up for the first time, it creates the initial data file with version,
currentEpoch, acceptedEpoch and zxid fields initialized to 0. The register supports two
operations, read and conditional write.
• read(): returns the metadata currently stored in the witness
• write(newVersion, metadata): The write operation takes as input new metadata and
its version. A writer process increments its last known version of the witness’s
metadata by 1 and invokes the write operation with the new or updated metadata.
The write will only succeed if the new version is greater than the current version of
the metadata stored in the witness. If the version criterion is satisfied, the witness
will overwrite its existing metadata with the received metadata and its version will be
updated with the received version number. These changes are written to the disk and
the new version number of the metadata is returned to the caller. Otherwise, if the
version check fails, the metadata will not be updated and -1 is returned.
Note: The witness behaves like a register only when it is in FOLLOWING state, it does
not serve read and most importantly write requests when it is in LOOKING state.
The read operations return metadata as a blob (a byte array). In write operations, the
metadata is accepted as a blob. Ideally, the witness should not understand the contents of
the metadata it stores, because a byzantine witness could leak this information and use it
for a malicious purpose. However, at this point we are not modifying the way in which
the witness participates in the leader election. So, the witness will have the ability to
unpack the metadata and use it during the leader election.
The witness will not be aware of any of the ZAB states like DISCOVERY,
SYNCHRONIZATION and BROADCAST. The leader reads from or writes to the witness
and interprets and utilizes the responses based on its (leader’s) current ZAB state. We
implemented a separate thread called WitnessHandler to do this job on behalf of the
leader. The purpose and functionality of the WitnessHandler are similar to that of a
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LearnerHandler. For example, if the leader has to send a transaction proposal to the
witness, it does so using its WitnessHandler thread. Since a witness can only understand
read and write requests,o the witness handler converts that proposal into a write request
and invokes the write() witness operation (through RPC). Once the operation completes, it
processes the response and converts it into an acknowledgment for that proposal. This use
case is just one example of how a WitnessHandler interprets an Witness RPC’s response
based on the context.
5.2.1 Writing to a Witness
From the description of write operation, we can see that a witness only relies on the
version criterion to determine whether a write can succeed or not. Generally, for a replica
to follow the leader, it should utilize individual parts of the described metadata to
transition between the ZAB states and participate in them. Given the limitations of the
witness, it is the responsibility of the leader to perform any required checks on individual
metadata variables before writing to the witness. Conceptually, before writing to a witness
the Leader should read the witness’s current metadata to determine if the witness is still in
the same epoch as the Leader. Because, if the witness is in a different epoch it means that
the Leader has lost the support of the witness in this epoch and it will stop
communicating with the witness. However, in implementation we can safely write to the
witness without having to read first by applying Algorithm 1.o
The WitnessHandler is responsible for writing metadata to the witness. During
Discovery it reads witness’s metadata and version for the first time and records this
information. In the subsequent Synchronization and Broadcast phases, whenever the
WitnessHandler needs to write new metadata to the witness, it increments the last
recorded version and invokes the write() with it. We know that the witness only accepts a
write when the new version in the write request is greater than its current version and then
returns the new version in the response. So the WitnessHandler considers a write to be
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Algorithm 1: Write Metadata to Witness





// for every write operation
newMetadata = createMetadata();
writeResponse = witness.write(lastRecordedVersion +1, newMetadata);
if writeResponse.version() == lastRecordedVersion +1 then
// write sucessful




// Leader lost support of the witness and shuts down
the witness handler.
end
successful, if the version in the write response is equal to the version in the write request.
If the write is successful, it records the version and uses it during the next write operation.
If the version numbers in the request and response are different, it means that the witness
is either following another leader, that is, witness is in a different epoch or it is looking
for a new leader (witness returns -1 as read response when it is Looking state). The leader
considers this version mismatch as a write failure and stops communicating with the
witness. In summary, we eliminate the need to read before doing a write by comparing the
versions in the write request and response and recording the version after a successful
write.
5.3 Visuals
This section contains a series of diagrams that illustrate certain key properties of ZAB
witnesses and compares them with ZAB replicas.
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Fig. 10: Zookeeper ensemble with witness: two replicas and one witness. Solid circles
represent replicas and a dotted circle represents a witness. All the servers (replicas and
witnesses) maintain persistent connections between each other to exchange leader election
related messages. Replicas maintain additional persistent connections (show in double
lines), to exchange quorum related messages during broadcast with each other. Such a
persistent connection is not maintained between the leader replica and a witness.
Fig. 11: Persistent State Comparison: Illustrate information maintained by Replicas and
by Witnesses. Replicas maintain complete copies of coordination data which includes
the Transaction Log and the Znode Tree. Whereas, a witness only stores three variables;
currentEpoch, acceptedEpoch and zxid.
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(a) Replica to Replica (b) Replica to Witness
Fig. 12: Communication Comparison: A persistent connection is established between
the Leader and a Follower replica. They exchange the messages listed in Figure (a) via
that connection. Figure (b) depicts the communication between a Leader replica and a
following witness. A leader communicates with the witness by invoking its read() and
write() operations through RPC
(a) Replica (b) Witness
Fig. 13: Server State Transition: Figures (a) and (b) illustrate the Zookeeper Server state
transitions in a replica and witness. Since a Witness cannot become a leader, it will not
transition into Leading state.
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(a) Replica (b) Witness
Fig. 14: Zab State Transition: Figures (a) illustrate the Zab state transitions in a replica
and witness. Witnesses is unaware of Zab states.
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6 ZAB WITH WITNESS
ZAB protocol has four phases Election, Discovery, Synchronization and Broadcast. In
this section, I will explain how a witness is used in each of these phases and highlight the
changes required in a full-fledged zookeeper server to work with a witness.
6.1 Election
A witness starts an election when it transitions to LOOKING state. A witness will
only vote for a full replica server. Since a witness cannot vote for itself it starts the
election by sending an empty notification (initial vote) to all the zookeeper servers in the
ensemble. A replica server receiving this empty vote could either be participating in an
election or it could have completed its election. The next two subsections explore these
two scenarios.
Replica is Looking
If a replica server in Looking state receives an initial vote from the witness it sends its
current vote as a reply. Upon receiving the current vote from the replica, the witness
checks if the proposed replica is at least as up-to-date as itself (witness). If this predicate
is met, the witness updates its current vote to proposed replica and begins the exchange of
notifications. From this point onward, the witness behaves like a normal replica until it
receives a quorum of notifications about a potential leader.
Replica is Following or Leading
If the replica is Following or Leading, it means that it is currently not participating in
the leader election. When a Follower replica receives the initial notification from the
witness, it responds by sending a notification containing the id of the leader replica that it
is following. When the leader receives the initial notification, it sends a notification
containing its own id to the witness. When witness receives notifications from
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Fig. 15: R1 and R2 are two full-fledged Zookeeper servers and W is a witness. Empty-
Notfctn is an empty election vote notification.
follower/leader replicas, it counts their votes. It continues the election process until it
receives a quorum of votes for a particular leader replica.
The witness has now completed its leader election and found that a particular replica
is the potential leader. At this point, a replica server, will transition to Following state and
initiate connection with the potential leader in the Discovery phase, bring itself up to date
with the Leader during Synchronization and finally begins receiving transactions in the
Broadcast phase. However, a witness in Following state is basically a register that serves
read and write calls, it is neither aware nor participates in any of the Zab states. Most
importantly, unlike a replica server a witness does not initiate or establish connection with
the leader when it is in Following state. It is the elected leader’s responsibility to indirectly
utilize the witness during its Zab states by invoking read() and write() calls. For this to
happen, the witness should somehow inform the Leader that it has completed the leader
election and is ready to follow the leader replica, so that the leader can bring witness up
to date with itself and use witness in replicating transactions. In implementation we do
this in the following manner. Once the witness has reached a quorum over a potential
leader, it first transitions to Following state. Then, it sends out a notification to the
potential leader, informing that it is following the leader replica and then exits from its
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leader election. Once the Leader receives this notification, it makes the witness indirectly
participate in its Zab phases. This is explained in detail in the next 2 sections.
In summary, the following changes have been made to LeaderElection while handling
notifications from a witness.
• Support empty election notifications
• Potential leader will record the election completion notification sent by the witness.
6.2 Discovery and Synchronization
The witness specification states that a witness in Following state is just a register and
it is oblivious to the various ZAB states and the messages exchanged by full-fledged
Zookeeper servers. Unlike a normal follower, a witness cannot initiate communication
with the leader. In order to use a Witness in ZAB, the leader has to read metadata from or
write to the witness whenever required and interpret the responses based on the context in
which those calls are made. The Leader communicates with the witness through a
separate thread called WitnessHandler. Figures 16 and 17 explain how a potential leader
server uses witness in Discovery and Synchronization.
Assume that a zookeeper server just transitioned from Looking state to Leading state
after completing the election and started its Discovery phase. Assume that the witness has
also completed its leader election, then transitioned from Looking to Following state,
notified the potential leader that it is following that replica and is ready to serve read and
write requests. Assume that the leader has begun concurrently communicating with other
followers. Based on the received notification, the leader begins communicating with
witness by first creating the WitnessHandler thread.
The WitnessHandler begins the Discovery phase by reading the metadata and its
version from the witness. The WitnessHandler records the returned version number,
extracts acceptedEpoch from the metadata. The leader uses the acceptedEpoch values
returned by a quorum of followers, including the witness, to generate a newEpoch. The
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Fig. 16: Discovery
Generate newEpoch1: The leader server uses the acceptedEpoch read from the witness
along with the acceptedEpochs sent by other followers (if any) to generate a newEpoch.
DiscoveryMetadata2: New metadata object containing the generated newEpoch and
currentEpoch and zxid values copied over from the previously read metadata
QuorumReached3: The potential leader server has received a quorum of NEWEPOCH
acknowledgements.
WitnessHandler constructs a new metadata object by setting the newEpoch value to the
acceptedEpoch field and copies over the currentEpoch and zxid values from the
previously read metadata. It then writes the new metadata to the witness. If the write is
successful, it means that the witness has completed the Discovery phase. The leader
interprets the successful write of the discovery metadata as witness sending
acknowledgment(ACK) for NEWEPOCH message. In Discovery phase, the potential
leader uses the witness’s NEWEPOCH ACK only if a natural quorum could not be
formed. Once the potential leader, acquires quorum of NEWEPOCH ACKs (either natural
or with the help of witness) it begins the Synchronization phase and notifies the waiting
FollowerHandlers and the WitnessHandler to bring the followers and the witness up to
date with itself. To synchronize the witness with the leader, the WitnessHandler creates a
new metadata object with acceptedEpoch and currentEpoch set to the epoch value agreed
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Fig. 17: Synchronization
SynchMetadata1: metadata object with acceptedEpoch and currentEpoch set to the epoch
value agreed upon during the Discovery phase and zxid value set to the zxid of the last
log entry committed by the potential leader
QuorumReached3: The potential leader server has received a quorum of NEWLEADER
acknowledgements.
upon during the Discovery phase and zxid value set to the zxid of the last log entry
committed by the potential leader. It then writes the new metadata to witness. If the write
is successful, it means that the witness has completed the Synchronization phase. The
potential leader interprets the successful write of the synchronization metadata as witness
sending acknowledgment(ACK) for NEWLEADER message and adds it to the
NEWLEADER-ACK count. It then waits for a quorum of NEWLEADER-ACKs and
progresses to Broadcast phase once a quorum is received. The potential leader uses the
NEWLEADER-ACK from the witness only if a natural quorum of ACKs is not received.
If it used the witness’s NEWLEADER ACK to progress to BROADCAST phase, it marks
the witness as ACTIVE. Otherwise, the witness is marked PASSIVE.
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Fig. 18: R1 and R2 are full-fledged Zookeeper servers/replicas. W is the witness. R1, R2
and W together form a Zookeeper ensemble. R1 is the leader of that ensemble. The red
cross beside a server’s zxid value means that the server has failed in that state.
6.3 Write Restrictions
In current implementation of ZAB, a follower can receive a transaction before the
transaction is logged to the disk by leader. This is possible because, in the leader process,
the action of appending a transaction to its log and the action of sending a proposal to a
follower happens in two separate threads. So, a leader can fail after sending a transaction
proposal to a follower but before locally logging that transaction. In a Zookeeper
ensemble consisting of only replica servers, this scenario does not have negative
consequences because, if the transaction is logged in at least one follower, that follower
can become the leader of the next epoch and eventually that transaction will be replicated
to other followers. However, in the case of a Zookeeper ensemble with a Witness,
following the same mechanism of forwarding proposals would have negative
consequences.
Suppose that we have a Zookeeper ensemble of 2 replicas R1 and R2 and 1 witness
server W. R1 is the Leader for the epoch e. Let us also suppose that the entire ensemble is
synchronized at zxid = 4 as shown in Figure 18. When the leader R1 receives a new
request from the client, it creates a new transaction with zxid = 5 and begins broadcasting
the proposals. Figure 18 depicts two failure scenarios.
In Scenario 1, Leader R1 failed after sending the transaction proposal to the witness
but before adding the transaction to its log and sending it to R2. So, at the time of leader
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R1’s failure, R1 and R2 are at zxid 4, but the witness is at zxid 5. After R1’s failure, R2
and W will eventually transition to Looking state and R2 starts an election for the next
epoch e’. But R2 will not receive a vote from W because W is at zxid 5, but R2 is at 4 i.e.
witness is ahead of replica R2. The leader election will not be completed because R2 will
not get a quorum and W cannot become a leader because it is a witness. In this situation a
new leader can only be established once R1 recovers. However, if R2 fails by the time R1
recovers, R1 alone will not be able to establish a quorum because of the same reason
described above. So, in scenario 1, for a new leader to be established R1 and R2 should
both be available/up throughout the duration of election and leader establishment.
In Scenario 2, Leader R1 failed after adding the transaction to its log and forwarding
it to the witness but before sending the proposal to R2. So, at the time of R1’s failure, R1
and W are at zxid 5. R2 is at 4. The states of R2 and W in this scenario match the states
of R2 and W described in scenario 1. Hence, due to the same reason described in scenario
1, R2 cannot become a leader and the new leader cannot be elected until R1 recovers.
However, once R1 recovers a leader will be established even if R2 fails by the time R1
recovers and starts the election. This is because the witness W will vote for R1 in the
leader election. If we compare scenarios 1 and 2, we can observe that in both scenarios a
leader cannot be established until R1 recovers. However, in scenario 2 it is guaranteed
that a leader will be established once R1 recovers because at least one replica server in
the ensemble is at least as up to date as the Witness W.
To avoid running into scenarios like these, we impose two important restrictions on a
leader server,
Write Restriction 6.1. Leader should send a transaction’s zxid to the witness only after
the transaction has been appended to its log
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Fig. 19: Depicts the possible state of the ensemble when the leader R1 fails in both the
scenarios. In scenario 2, the ensemble could be in one of the three states shown above.
Write Restriction 6.2. If a natural quorum is available, the leader will send a
transaction’s zxid to the witness only after it has been appended to the logs of a natural
quorum of servers. The first restriction is subsumed in this restriction.
Imposing these restrictions, guarantees that a zxid stored in the witness will be present
in the transaction log of at least one replica Zookeeper server in the ensemble. With these
restrictions in place, the scenarios shown in Figure 18 will result in the states shown in
Figure 19 assuming that R2 is up when the leader R1 fails.
In Figure 19, we can observe that in both the scenarios because of the imposed
restrictions there is at least one replica server that is as latest as the witness. As a result,
R2 is guaranteed to get the witness’s vote during the leader election.
Despite enforcing these restrictions there is one valid failure scenario in which the
witness could hold a later state than the surviving replica and stall the progress of the
ensemble. Consider the ensemble depicted in Figure 20. Assume that all the servers are
synchronized at zxid 4, R1 is the leader and R2 has just failed. R1 continues to make
progress with the help of W. Assume that R1 and W have committed two new
transactions and ensemble is currently at zxid 6. Assume that R1 failed at this point and
R2 has recovered after R1 has failed. Now W(zxid:6) will not vote for R2(zxid:4) because
it holds a more recent state than R2. The ensemble becomes unavailable until R1 recovers.
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Fig. 20: Valid Edge Case
This scenario is valid and not preventable because allowing W to vote for R2 when R2 is
trailing behind W will result in sacrificing safety for availability.
6.4 Broadcast
Now let us look into how a leader server utilizes the witness in the Broadcast phase.
The witness just stores the zxid value associated with a transaction in its metadata. In
order to send a transaction proposal to a witness, the leader builds a metadata object
containing that transaction’s zxid value and invokes the write operation on the witness.
The response returned by the witness to the write operation is interpreted as an ACK to
the proposal. The leader does not send any form of Commit messages to the witness,
because the witness is just a register that stores metadata. As explained earlier, at the end
of Synchronization phase, the leader locally marks the witness Active or Passive based on
the availability of a natural quorum. Figures 21 and 22 depicts how the leader utilizes
Passive and Active witnesses to make progress.
6.4.1 Working with Passive Witness
The leader marks the witness as Passive, when a natural quorum can be formed i.e. a
majority of replica zookeeper servers are up and synchronized with the leader. Having a
natural quorum implies two things. One, we should apply the second restriction described
earlier before sending a transaction to the witness. Two, the leader does not need the ACK
from the witness to reach quorum over the proposal.
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Fig. 21: Broadcast with Passive witness in 2R + 1 W ensemble. F-Follower server, L-
Leader server, WH- WitnessHandler thread running inside the leader L, W – Witness.
Reached Natural Quorum1 – Leader was able to reach quorum over a proposal by just
using the ACKs sent by full-fledged Zookeeper servers.
We impose the second restriction in the following manner. Consider the 3 server
Zookeeper ensemble depicted in Figure 21. It has 2 replica servers and one witness.
Where L is the leader, F is the follower and W is the witness. When the leader L receives
a new client request, it creates a transaction from that request and sends the transaction
proposal P only to the follower F. The leader L will automatically ACK the proposal P.
So, when L receives an ACK from F for P, it means that a quorum has been reached for P
only with the help of replica servers and L can now commit that transaction. At this point,
the leader L requests its WitnessHandler thread to send the transaction proposal P to the
witness W. The leader need not establish a precedence order between committing the
transaction and sending the proposal to the witness. When the WitnessHandler receives
this request from the leader, it constructs a new metadata object with the transaction’s
zxid value and writes it to the witness. The write operation’s response is interpreted as an
ACK to that proposal and sent to the Leader. However, the leader ignores this ACK as it
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Fig. 22: Broadcast with Active Witness in 2R + 1 W ensemble. F-Follower server, L-
Leader server, WH- WitnessHandler thread running inside the leader L, W – Witness. The
server F marked in red is down.
has already reached quorum over the proposal. In summary, when the witness is passive,
the leader sends a transaction proposal to the witness only after it has been replicated to
(added to the logs of) a natural quorum of servers.
6.4.2 Working with Active Witness
When a natural quorum cannot be formed, the leader marks the witness as Active and
utilizes its ACKs to reach quorum over proposals and commits them. Here the leader must
apply the first restriction described earlier. Let us consider the three server Zookeeper
ensemble shown in Figure 22. This ensemble has two 2 replica servers and one witness.
Of which L is the leader, the server F is down, and W is the witness. When L receives a
new client request, it creates a transaction from that request and appends the transaction to
its log. Once the transaction is appended to its log, the leader requests the WitnessHandler
to send the transaction proposal to the Witness W. The WitnessHandler writes the
transaction’s zxid value to the witness and interprets a success response to the write
operation as an ACK and informs the leader. The leader uses the ACK from witness and
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Fig. 23: This figure illustrates a scenario in which zookeeper becomes unavailable when a
proposal is not sent to the witness.
its own ACK to reach quorum over the transaction and commits the transaction. In this
way the leader uses a witness to make progress when a natural quorum is not available.
6.4.3 Active – Passive transitions
During broadcast, in response to the dynamic changes to the availability of replica
follower servers, the leader can transition a witness from active to passive and vice versa.
Active to Passive: If a natural quorum can be formed.
Passive to Active: If a natural quorum can no longer be formed, the leader activates
the passive witness.
Existing heartbeat mechanism can be utilized to identify changes in the follower
availability. Leader performs a heartbeat using a combination of ping() and synched()
checks. Ping() sends a heartbeat all the followers twice per tick. Synced() validates if a
follower is within the sync window once per tick. If a quorum of followers is in sync with
the leader, then we have a natural quorum and the witness can be marked passive. If the
leader fails to get a natural quorum during this check and if the witness is in sync with the
leader (i.e within the sync window), then we can mark the witness as Active.
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While designing the protocol we observed an interesting edge case in which the leader
skips sending a proposal to the witness. As a consequence, the transaction associated with
that proposal and any future transactions will not be committed, rendering the zookeeper
ensemble unavailable despite having an established Leader and the witness supporting it.
Figure 23 illustrates this scenario. It shows a 3 server ensemble, where L is the Leader, F
is the Follower and W is the witness. In the beginning, all the servers are operational.
Hence, a natural quorum exists and the witness is marked passive. When L receives the
first client request, it builds a transaction with zxid 1. It then broadcasts Proposal:1 only
to F and not to W because W is passive at that point. The Leader concurrently adds the
transaction to its log and ACKs itself.Let us assume that F has failed after receiving
Proposal:1 but before it could log the transaction and send an ACK to L. So the Leader
will not be able to form a quorum over Proposal:1 and it does not commit that transaction.
Eventually, through the heartbeat mechanism, the leader detects that F has failed and
marks W as active. Note that Proposal:1 is still not sent to the Witness. Now when L
receives a new client request, it logs that transaction (zxid:2) and broadcasts Proposal:2 to
the witness, and reaches quorum over Proposal:2. However, L cannot commit
transaction:2 because transaction:1 was not yet committed. The same thing will happen
for all future transactions until F recovers. To prevent such a scenario, when the Leader
detects that it has lost a natural quorum and marks the witness active, it sends proposals
associated with all the uncommitted transactions to the witness. This is depicted in Figure
24.
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Fig. 24: This figure illustrates the correct run in which uncommitted transactions are resent
to the witness when the witness is marked active.
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7 IMPLEMENTATION
In the earlier sections, we have defined the scope of a Zab witness and described the
Zab protocol with witnesses. In this section, we will provide a high-level overview of the
witness’s implementation and the changes made in Zookeeper server code to make it work
with Witnesses.
7.1 Witness
The ZAB Witness has been implemented as a separate service that uses some of the
existing zookeeper code as a dependency. It has the following set of high-level
components.
7.1.1 Configuration File:
Just like a normal zookeeper server, during startup, a witness also loads its initial
configuration from its configuration file. It contains the following basic set of parameters.
• tickTime
The length of a single tick, which is the basic time unit used by ZooKeeper, as
measured in milliseconds. It is used to regulate heartbeats, and timeouts.For example,
the minimum pingTimeout is three ticks.
• dataDir
The location where a witness will store its metadata file and myid file.
• dataFileName
Name of the metadata file.
• initLimit
Amount of time, in ticks, a witness waits for the potential leader to begin the
Broadcast phase. This is equivalent to the initLimit parameter in a zookeeper
server configuration. In a witness, this parameter must be set to a higher value than a
normal zookeeper server. This is because, while deciding on NEWEPOCH and
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NEWLEADER messages, the potential leader first waits for initLimit of ticks
for a natural quorum to be formed before using the witness’s vote. So, when a
natural quorum is not formed, the potential leader will take more time than its
initLimit value. Hence, the initLimit set on a witness should be roughly
equal to the sum of initLimit set on the zookeeper servers and network latency
between a zookeeper server and a witness.
• pingLimit Time interval, in ticks, during which a witness in Following state
expects to receive at least one read() or write() request from the leader.
•
server.x = <hostname>:<grpcPort/quorumPort>:<electionPort>:[type]
Servers making up the ZooKeeper ensemble. When the witness starts up, it
determines which server it is by looking for the file myid in the data directory. That
file contains the server number, in ASCII, and it should match x in server.x in the left
hand side of this setting. For a witness, type is mandatory. There are two ports. In
the first port, for a normal server, you should enter port number on which a server
listens to receive messages from its leader. For a witness, you should enter the port
of the witness gRPC service. The second port is used for leader election.










Fig. 25: This figure illustrates the various components in a Zab Witness server and the
interactions between them.
7.1.2 Metadata File:
The on-disk copy of the witness’s metadata. This file holds the 3 fields of metadata
(acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch and zxid) and its version. It gets overwritten for each
successful write.
7.1.3 In-memory Metadata copy:
We maintain an in memory copy of the metadata to service reads quickly. This is
shared by the Leader Elector and the Witness Service. The Leader Elector will only read
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the metadata, it can access specific fields in the metadata. The Witness Service, can both
read and write the metadata, it always accesses the complete metadata copy.
7.1.4 Controller:
We have seen that a witness has two server states; Looking and Following. The
controller is responsible for coordinating the transitions between these states. When the
witness enters Looking state, the controller starts the leader election. When the witness
begins Following, it starts the PingTimeoutChecker.
7.1.5 PingTimeoutChecker
The PingTimeoutChecker is started by the Controller when the witness transitions to
the Following state. It continuously checks if the witness has received a message from its
leader at least once per a configured time interval. It works alongside the Witness Service.
Whenever the witness service receives a read() or write() request from the leader, it
notifies the PingTimeoutChecker. If a time interval passes by without hearing from the
leader, i.e., without receiving a notification from the witness service, it assumes that the
leader is no longer alive and transitions to Looking state. The Controller then starts a new
leader election.
There are two types of time intervals; initLimit and pingLimit. These values are taken
from the configuration file and are described in Section 7.1.1. We have seen that, once the
witness transitions to Following, the Leader makes the witness indirectly participate in the
Zab phases; Discovery, Synchronization, and Broadcast. Out of these, Discovery and
Synchronization are considered as the initialization phases and they are expected to take
more time than the Broadcast phase. We use initLimit during initialization and pingLimit
during Broadcast. So, initLimit is usually higher than pingLimit. The witness expects to
receive a total of 4 messages during the initialization phases. So, for each of the first 4
messages, the PingTimeoutChecker waits for initLimit ticks. From the next message
onward, it will wait for pingLimit ticks, as the leader would have started the Broadcast
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phase by this point and would ping the witness twice per tick, in addition to sending
proposals.
7.1.6 Witness Service:
The Witness Service has been implemented as a gRPC service. It exposes two unary
RPCs; read() and write(). The signature and functionality of these procedures are
explained in Section 5.2. It services the read requests by accessing the in-memory
metadata copy. The write requests are serviced by first writing to the on-disk copy and
then to the in-memory copy of the metadata. These two operations are performed
atomically. Both read() and write() procedures access metadata as a blob. This service is
started when the witness server starts and runs as long as the witness is alive. However, it
serves requests only when the witness is in the Following state. Otherwise, it returns
empty responses with the version number set to -1. When the witness is in the Following
state, upon receiving either a read() or write() request, in addition to performing the
respective operations, it also notifies the PingTimeoutChecker. A sample proto file
containing the witness service definition is listed below.
service Witness {
rpc read(ReadRequest) returns (ReadResponse);





sint64 version = 1;
bytes metadata = 2;
}
message WriteRequest {
uint64 version = 1;




sint64 version = 1;
}
7.1.7 Leader Elector:
The Leader Elector is responsible for conducting the leader election when the witness
is in Looking state. We utilize the same majority quorum-based leader election algorithm
as a normal zookeeper server with modifications described in Section 6.1. When the
witness is in Following state, it helps other peers in the ensemble to complete their leader
election by responding to their vote notifications with its current vote. The Leader Elector
is started during the startup of the witness server. It communicates by establishing socket
connections with other servers in the ensemble.
7.2 Zookeeper Server
Here we discuss some of the important changes that have been made to the Zookeeper
Server code to work with witnesses.
7.2.1 Majority Quorum Verifier
We have seen in sections 4 and 6 that ZAB relies on majority quorums to elect a
leader, generate a new epoch, agree on a generated epoch, establish a new leader and
finally, replicate transactions. To verify majority quorums a Zookeeper server implements
two constructs; Quorum Verifier and SyncedLearnerTracker (SLT). The SLT, keeps tracks
of votes received from other servers over a particular decision. Given a set of votes, the
Quorum Verifier determines if a majority of the servers have agreed on that decision. Prior
to introducing witnesses in ZAB, all the servers that participated in a quorum are replicas
(followers or observers). All the follower replicas in the configuration are treated equally
i.e restrictions were not imposed on specific replicas and their votes are always counted.
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With our protocol changes witnesses can now participate in a quorum. But, unlike a
normal replica certain restrictions are imposed on a witness’s vote. The most important
one is that a witness’ vote should only be counted when a natural quorum cannot be
formed. To enforce this restriction, first the SLT has been modified to track votes from
replicas and witnesses separately. Then, the majority Quorum Verifier has been enhanced
to verify a quorum form with witnesses by counting replica and witness votes together.
The existing ability to count just the replica votes has been reused to verify a natural
quorum.
7.2.2 Sending Proposals to Witnesses:
In section 6.4 we have conceptually explained how a follower can log a transaction
that is not yet logged in the Leader and outlined the consequence of a witness doing the
same. To prevent this from happening, we highlighted two restrictions; restriction 6.1 and
restriction 6.2, which the leader must enforce before sending a proposal to a witness. In
this section, we first review how this issue occurs in current implementation without
witnesses. We then explain the changes made to enforce these restrictions. The same
changes ensure that proposals are sent to active witnesses at proposal stage and to passive
witnesses while sending out commit messages.
A change request received by the Leader flows through a chain of request processors
before finally being committed. Each Request Processor has a specific responsibility. First,
the PrepRequestProcessor converts the request into a Transaction and assigns it a unique
zxid. It ss then passed to the Proposal Request Processor which initiates two tasks in the
following order:
• Converts the transaction into proposal and broadcasts it to all the followers by
sending it to the respective Learner Handlers;
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• It then forwards the proposal to the SyncRequestProcessor, which appends the
transaction to the leader’s log and sends an ACK to itself and begins processing that
ACK.
These tasks execute concurrently on different threads. So, a follower might end up adding
a transaction to its log before the leader does.
We have seen that each LearnerHandler is a separate thread and works independently
of other Learner Handlers. When a LearnerHandler receives an ACK about a proposal, it
processes that ACK independently. Processing an ACK for a proposal means, recording
the ACK received for that proposal and checking if a majority quorum has been formed.
If a quorum is formed, the Leader sends Commit messages to its replicas and then applies
the transaction to its local data copy.
With this understanding, let us look at how the two restrictions are applied.
Enforcing Restriction 6.1 We do not send proposals to a witness in Proposal
Request Processor because at that point the leader might not yet log the transaction
in that proposal. Instead, we send proposals to the witness in the
SyncRequestProcessor once the transaction has been logged in the leader and if the
witness is active at that point. This guarantees that the transaction is logged in at
least one replica before it is sent to the witness.
Enforcing Restriction 6.2 We enforce this restriction in the following manner.
processing an ACK sent by a replica, if the Quorum Verifier determines that a
natural quorum has been formed and if the proposal was not sent to the witness in




The original Zab protocol guarantees three core safety properties. These properties
ensure that the states of zookeeper servers in an ensemble are consistent. In this section
we review each of these properties and then analyze if the modified Zab protocol
continues to hold them.
1) Integrity: This property ensures that servers in a zookeeper ensemble do not
spontaneously create transactions and commit them. This can be broken down into
two sub properties.
a) Leader Integrity: The leader prepares and broadcasts a transaction only if it has
received a coordination data change request from a client.
b) Follower Integrity: A follower only commits a transaction that is initially
broadcast by a leader.
A witness can never become a leader. So, it can never prepare and broadcast a
transaction. So, the Leader Integrity property still holds true. Now let us analyze the
Follower Integrity property. As you have seen, a witness does not understand the
concept of proposals and transactions. It just services metadata read and write
requests. While designing this protocol, we focused only on the functionality of the
witness and assumed that a WitnessHandler running in the Leader process is the only
entity that writes metadata to the witness. With this assumption, a witness only
accepts transactions that are broadcast by a Leader. Hence, we can say that the
Follower Integrity holds true. Since, the modified protocol satisfies both the Leader
and Follower Integrity properties, we can say that the Integrity property continues to
hold true.
2) Total Ordering: This property guarantees that all the servers in a zookeeper
ensemble commit transactions in the same order. A Witness does not maintain a
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transaction log, nor does it commit transactions because it does not hold a copy of
the coordination data. So the modifications made to Zab to incorporate witnesses do
not affect its Total Ordering Property.
3) Agreement: This property ensures that all the servers in the ensemble commit the
same set of transactions. The agreement property coupled with the total ordering
property guarantees that the states of zookeeper servers do not diverge.
In the modified protocol, we use witnesses to reach an agreement on transactions. So,
for the witness to violate the agreement property it should perform two actions,
Action 1: Witness should enable two distinct replicas in the ensemble to become
leaders for the same epoch.
Action 2: Witness should enable both the leader processes in broadcasting proposals
by acknowledging their proposals.
We provide intuitions about why a witnesses cannot violate agreement property by
showing that the protocol does not allow a witness to perform the actions listed
above.
Intuition against Action 1: The WitnessHandler running in a potential leader makes
the witness participate in new leader establishment (Discovery and Synchronization)
by following the same protocol as the one used by a normal follower replica
(explained in Section 4.1). The new leader establishment protocol guarantees that
only one leader will be established per a given epoch (Claim 29 of [22]). Hence, a
witness cannot enable the establishment of two leaders for the same epoch.
Intuition against Action 2: For the witness to simultaneously acknowledge
proposals sent by two leaders, the protocol should allow two leaders to be
established. We have already shown that the protocol does not allow this to happen
for a given epoch. Even if we assume that two distinct leaders can simultaneously be
established either for the same epoch or for two different epochs, the witness still
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cannot perform this action. When sending a proposal to the witness, the
WitnessHandler will check if the witness holds the expected version of the metadata.
We assume that the WitnessHandler is the only entity that is writing to a witness. So,
when the version check fails, the leader assumes that it has lost the support of the
witness and shuts down the WitnessHandler. From that point onwards, the witness
will not receive proposals sent by the leader in that epoch. Considering that a Leader
increments metadata version by 1 for each write operation, the version check will
fail at one of the Leaders and it will stop communicating with the witness.
8.2 Liveness
The Zab’s liveness property states that when a Leader proposes a transaction, it will
be eventually committed. The following requirements must be satisfied for this property
to hold true,
1) A quorum Q of servers should be operational.
2) One of the servers in Q, should be elected as a leader l and l is up.
3) Servers in Q should be able to exchange messages in a timely fashion
From these requirements we can see that a quorum of servers staying available and
communicating with each other are the basis for the Zab’s Liveness property. In previous
sections, we have seen that quorums are used in all phases of the ZAB protocol;
Discovery, Synchronization and Broadcast. If a quorum cannot be formed at any point
during these phases, a server (Leader or Follower) would transition to Looking and starts
Leader Election. If a quorum of servers are not available during the Leader Election, a
Leader will not be elected. As a result, Zookeeper ensemble will stop serving coordination
change requests sent by clients. In other words, zookeeper becomes unavailable.
As we have seen in section 3, if the servers of a zookeeper ensemble are spread across
just two sites, if one site fails, the servers in the other site may not be able to form a
quorum. The two-site problem negatively effects the liveness of Zab. We claim that by
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incorporating witnesses into Zookeeper ensemble, we have increased the Liveness of Zab
in the two-site scenario. In Section 3 we showed that the solution for the two-server
problem can be applied to two-site problem. So, we structure our claim in terms of the
two-server problem.
Claim: Consider a Zookeeper ensemble composed of 3 servers (2 replicas and 1 witness).
We make the following assumptions about the current state of the ensemble,
1) All servers in the ensemble are operational.
2) One of the replicas has been established as the leader.
Under these assumptions, we claim that such a Zookeeper ensemble will tolerate one
replica failure. That is, the surviving replica can make progress with the help of the
witness.
Intuition for the Correctness of the Claim: In this work we provide intuition about the
correctness of this claim. A formal proof is deferred to future work. We informally show
that our claim is correct by comparing the consequence of one replica failure in the
following two scenarios,
Scenario 1: Standard two-server scenario, a Zookeeper ensemble composed of two
replicas.
Scenario 2: A zookeeper ensemble composed of two replicas and one witness.
In both the scenarios, a replica failure could mean a Leader replica failure or a Follower
replica failure. In Scenario 1, when one replica fails, regardless of whether it is the Leader
or the Follower, the Zookeeper ensemble becomes unavailable because a quorum cannot
be formed. In Scenario 2, Follower replica failure and Leader replica failure are handled
differently. The handling of Follower replica failure is trivial, the Leader marks the
witness as Active and broadcasts new proposals with the help of the witness. Before
discussing how the Leader replica failure is handled, let us look at the state of the
ensemble just before the failure. The two assumptions imply that a natural quorum exists,
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and the witness is passive. Write Restriction 6.2 guarantees that, at the time of the Leader
failure, the surviving replica is at least as up-to-date as the witness. After the Leader
failure, the surviving replica and the witness eventually transition to Looking and starts
leader election. Since the witness is at most as up-to-date as the replica, it is guaranteed to
vote for the replica in the leader election. The replica wins the leader election, establishes
itself as the leader and begin broadcasting proposals with the help of the witness by
marking it as Active. Thus, adding a witness to the ensemble increases the Liveness of
Zab in the two-server scenario under the given set of assumptions.
However, as explained in section 6.3 this increase in Liveness is guaranteed only
when the operational replica’s state is at least as up-to-date as the witness’s state. This
observation has also been made in [5]. The write restrictions 6.1 and 6.2 prevent the
ensemble from reaching the unfavorable states shown in Scenarios 1 and 2 of Figure 18.
This observation is included in the assumptions for our claim. Despite these restrictions,
as shown in, Figure 20 there is one valid scenario in which a witness can get ahead of a
replica. It is a consequence of the witness not maintaining a copy of the actual data. In
this scenario, the witness will not vote for the surviving replica. Hence, the ensemble
remains unavailable until a natural quorum becomes operational and a new leader replica
is established. In this scenario, the liveness of a 2 replica and 1 witness zookeeper
ensemble is equivalent to that of a 2 replica Zookeeper ensemble.
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9 FUTURE WORK
As mentioned in sections 4 and 6, the Zab protocol has two parts. In part one, servers
in the ensemble participate in the Leader election to elect a leader by exchanging votes. In
part two, the elected leader establishes itself as the leader, brings the followers up to date,
and replicates new coordination data changes to its followers. In this work, we focused on
part 2. That is, we have modified the Zab protocol to make the Leader server utilize a
witness server in the Following state as a register that can only be read from or written to
whenever required. Although we adjusted the Leader election algorithm to incorporate
witnesses, the core part of the algorithm remains the same. The witness conducts its
Leader election like a normal replica. Replicas communicate with the witness during
leader election in the same way as they do with other replicas except for the limitations
described in section 6.1. In future, we want the witness to behave like a register in all
phases of the protocol. So, in the next part of this work, we will explore ways to modify
the Leader Election algorithm to enable the replicas to utilize the witness as a register.
Replicas and witnesses should not explicitly exchange any election related messages. Any
communication with the witness should happen through a read or write operation. As a
consequence, witnesses need not unpack the metadata they store. So, the replicas can
encrypt the metadata before writing to the witness.
ZooKeeper uses a crash(and recovery) failure model: it assumes that all replicas
behave as designed and any faults in the system are due to external failures that will cause
the replica with the fault to crash and stop participating in the system. A byzantine failure
model does not assume that replicas behave as designed and may actively try to break the
system. While there is a rich history of research into implementing byzantine tolerant
systems [23], they have not made their way to production systems. Because witnesses run
in an untrusted environment, we will enhance the design of Zab witnesses in a way that
can detect and tolerate byzantine witnesses while not changing the failure model for the
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rest of ZooKeeper. The changes proposed for the Leader Election algorithm aligns with
this end goal because the overall proactive interaction between the witness and the rest of
the Zookeeper ensemble will be minimized.
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10 CONCLUSION
When the replicas of a majority quorum-based system are distributed across just two
failure domains, the failure of even a single domain may prevent the replicas in the
surviving failure domain from forming a majority quorum, thus causing the system to
become unavailable. One way to solve this problem is to host an additional replica in a
third independent failure domain. (So that the system has replicas in two operational
domains.) However, if an entire data center is considered as a failure domain this solution
becomes an extremely costly one to implement. Hosting an additional replica in a cloud
provider’s machine will provide us the required independent failure domain. However, it
poses security concerns because the critical data of an organization will be hosted outside
its network boundary. To alleviate these concerns we have proposed to host a witness in
the cloud provider’s machine instead of a replica.
Our analysis showed that solving the two-server problem using witnesses will also
solve the two-site problem. We solved the two-server problem in the context of Zookeeper
by incorporating witnesses into Zab. Now, a Zookeeper ensemble with two replicas and
one witness can tolerate the failure of one replica. Since the witness will be hosted in an
untrusted environment, we made design choices that would prevent the witness from
knowing the internal workings of Zab. For example, in the Following state, the witness
behaves like a register and is oblivious to the various Zab states. Moreover, the Leader
uses the witness’s vote only when a natural quorum does not exist. These design choices
align with our future goal to make Zookeeper tolerate Byzantine witnesses.
We have shown that a Zookeeper ensemble with two replicas and one witness can
tolerate the failure of one of the replicas. We have also shown that our changes do not
impact the safety properties of Zab.
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